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SALT II:

A STUDY

Daniel G. Rathbun, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1989
The issue addressed in this thesis is whether the
SALT II treaty, signed in 1979, should have been ratified
by the United States Senate following its submission in
the spring of that year.

The author began by exploring

the background of the arms control agreements of the late
1960s and early/mid 1970s, then explored that SALT II
treaty itself in some detail.

Research data were drawn

from a number of sources during the compilation of this
paper.

The conclusion drawn in this thesis is that the

SALT II treaty, in its submitted form, should not have
been rat i f i e d .

W hile the agreement contained some

favorable points, these were outweighed by its overall
flaws, rendering the treaty ultimately unacceptable from
a strategic point of view.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Between 1969 and 1979 the United States and the
Soviet Union engaged in a series of negotiations aimed at
slowing and eventually halting the arms race.

This

process is generally referred to as the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, or SALT.

The goal of this effort,

which spanned a decade and three presidential adminis
trations was to find some way of freezing the arms race
at the levels then current. Further additions to the
superpowers' nuclear arsenals, American spokesmen argued,
would only be made at an ever increasing cost and would
do nothing to increase the national security of either
nation.
The chief results of these negotiations were the
SALT I and SALT II pacts of 1972 and 1979.

The first

treaty severely restricted the development and deployment
of antiballistic missile systems, and put a five year
1 imitation on the number of offensive missile systems
both nations could have.

It was ratified by the U.S.

Senate in 1972 after fierce debate.

The SALT II pact,

negotiated from 1973 to 1979 was debated by the Senate in
the summer and fall of the latter year.
1

It too ran into

2

serious opposition from a number of senators who felt the
accord restricted American strategic development too
much, while not restricting the Soviet Union enough.

The

treaty was also opposed by a small number of liberal
senators, who felt the pact was a parody of real arms
control, and should therefore not be r�tified.
It is the purpose of this thesis to briefly explore
the background of arms control agreements in the early
and mid 1970s, and then explore the SALT II treaty in
some detail, analyzing the major provisions of the pact
in light of the strategic positions of both the United
States and the Soviet Union at that time.

The paper will

then turn to criticisms offered by both legislators and
arms control experts during the ratification debate
•
during the summer and fall of 1979.

The general question

this writer will attempt to answer is:

was the SALT II

accord a "good deal" for the United States?
•

In other

words, did it offer real limitations on the development
and dep loymen t of strategic weapons systems, while
preserving the security of the United States?
In examining the technical points of the treaty, and
by analyzing the reaction to it in the Senate, this
writer hopes to develop a better
• understanding of the
pact and why it faced the problems it did.

The point of

this thesis is not merely to discuss the major strategic
provisions of SALT II:

rather, it is an attempt to

3

explore the military impact of the pact, as well as the
political challenges the agreement faced.
qu e st io n f a c in g

The underlying

t h is st u de n t is why

the trea t y

encountered the problems i t did, and wha t this might
imply for future strategic arms control agreements.

CHAPTER II
ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1960s
The question of placing some form of control over
strategic nuclear weapons was raised in 1964, at the
United Nations-sponsored disarmament conference held in
Geneva,

Sw itzerland.

There, the head of the American

delegation proposed that such negotiations be carried out
separately from any sort of comprehensive arms control
discussions.1

As to why the United States put forward

s u c h a pr oposal at that time leads to one possible
answer:

the American government realized that comprehen

sive negotiations were not succeeding, and hoped that by
separating the issues of strategic weapons from tactical
nuclear weapons, more progress could be made.
Whatever the reason, nothing came of the American
effort, although a similar offer was made by Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara in 1966.

During the period 1964-

6 8, the United States finished deploying the land-based
portion o f its stra teg ic nuclear triad, i.e., the
Minuteman II and Minuteman III missiles; planned the
deployment of a new generation of submarine-launched
1smoke, Richard, National Security and the Nuclear
(New York: Random House, 1987) , pg.
Dilemma, ( 2nd ed.) •
156.
4

5
ballistic missiles

(SLBMs); ordered extensive research

and development of Multiple Independently Targetable
Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) technology; and prepared for the
deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.
MIRV and ABM

The last two steps were probably the most signifi
cant parts of America's nuclear building at the time.

By

continuing research into MIRV technology (although not
ordering its deployment), the United States hoped to
achieve a new level of strategic stability.
S ov iet

Union

c o n t i n ued

its

As the

r a pid buildup o f

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), as well as
carrying out research on its own ABM system, the fear
developed that the Soviets would be able to launch a
crippling first strike (see Appendix B) with their ICBMs
and SLBMs.

They then use their ABMs to destroy American

missiles launched in a retaliatory second strike (see
Appendix B).

By MIRVing both ICBMs and SLBMs American

strategist believed they could saturate the proposed
Soviet ABM system with warheads, thus maintaining the
assured destruction of Soviet industrial, military and
civilian targets.2

2Ibid., pp. 161-63.

6

Possessing a nationwide ABM system would also serve
t h e United States in another way.
superpowers,
weapons:

Besides the two

three other nations possessed nuclear

Great Britain, France, and the People's

Republic of China.

Should the accidental launch of one

or more missiles occur, or should the PRC decide to
launch a deliberate attach with their tiny arsenal of
missiles, the United States assumed it would be able to
destroy the incoming missiles before they reached their
targets.

Thus, both the building of the ABM system as

well as the Continuing research into MIRV technology were
examples of what McNamara termed the "action-reaction
syndrome"; the actions of one nation (the Soviet Union)
causing another nation (the United States) to take steps
to counter that action.
Early Treaties
The cost, complexity, and danger associated with the
arms race led both superpowers, and other nations as
well, to sign two treaties in the late 1960s that dealt
with nuclear weapons.

The first, the Outer Space Treaty

of 1967, banned the deployment of nuclear weapons in
space or on any celestial body, and prohibited military
maneuvers or the establishment of military bases in space
or on any celestial body.

The following year the

NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed, which provided

7

that "Nuclear Nations" would not provide nuclear weapons
or assistance in developing them, to non-nuclear states,
and that the non-nuclear countries would not develop
nuclear weapons on their own or accept them from other
nations.

In addition, the nuclear states which singed

the treaty pledged to work in good faith toward ending
t h e a r m s race and securing a mutual disarmament
agreeme n t .

This l a s t c l ause w a s inserted at the

insistence of a number of prominent non-nuclear nations,
who feared that without such an agreement one or more of
the nuclear countries might be tempted to use its nuclear
arsenal to blackmail other nations.3
With that additional pledge in mind, the agreement
of the Soviet Union and the United States to begin talks
o n s 1 o wing the arms race takes on new meaning.

As

indicated earlier, the United States had been calling for
such talks since
1967,

1964.

At the Glassboro Summit of June

McNamara gave a presentation to Soviet Premier

A le x s e i Ko sygin on the po ssi b ility of b i l ateral
negotiations on the issue.

Over the next eleven months

further messages were exchanged on the subject, and in
May of

19 6 8

the Soviet government agreed to hold such

talks.

Before a starting date could be set, however, the

3united States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Arms Con tro 1 and Disarmament Agreements, (Washington,
D. C. : U.S. ACDA, l982) , pp. 82-86.

8
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that year
made negotiations impossible. 4

4rbid., pp. 132-33.

CHAPTER III
SALT I

In January of 1969, following the inauguration of
newly elected president Richard Nixon, the Soviets again
made the offer to begin talks aimed at curbing the arms
race.

At the advice of Henry Kissinger, the president's

assistant for national security affairs, Nixon agreed
that such talks should commence.

In November of 1969 the

first session of the talks began in Helsinki, Finland.
Each party used the four week session to gain a better
understanding of the other side's point of view.5

Between the spring of 1970 and the spring of 1972,
the two negotiating teams shuttled back and forth between
Helsinki, Finland and Vienna, Austria, discussing both
offensive and defensive weapons systems.

It was quickly

realized that it would be easier to limit the latter than
the former, due to two factors:
1.

Neither side had developed defensive systems to

the degree they had advanced their offensive systems
capability.
2.

Both sides see med intent on keeping their

offensive systems as unlimited as possible in order to
5Ibid., pp. 132-133.
9

10

maintain assured deterrence against the other. 6
Once that was established, the next step was to
further define the categories of defensive systems both
sides possessed.

These systems were broken down into two

subtypes:
1.

Anti-aircraft,

2.

Anti-missile.

The former were too highly developed and deployed to
seri ously limit, but the latter were still open for
n egoti ati o n .

Neither sup erpo wer had deplo y e d a n

effective ABM system, and limiting them was viewed as
aiding in deterrence.

As Richard Smoke (1987), the noted

security policy expert, points out:
The essence of deterrence was that each side
would be confident of its ability to destroy
the other's cities.
If each side knew the
other were prohibited by SALT from trying to
defend itself against missile attacks, then
each could remain confident that its current
offen sive forces would b e suffi cient for
assured destructi on capabilities.
Further
expansion and development of offensive forces
would seem less desirable, and agreement to
freeze them might therefore become easier.7
The issue of limiting offensive nuclear forces
proved to be a more thorny topic.

Both nations had well

developed systems of ICBMs and SLBMs, and the United
States had a large fleet of long-range bombers.
6 smoke,

op. cit., pp. 157-58.

7smoke, op. cit., p. 158.

The
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United States also had a large number of tactical nuclear
or forward based nuc lear weapons systems in Western
Europe and the Far East, capable of striking Soviet
territory.

The Soviet Union was anxious to put the FBS

w e apons a n d

the i n t ercon t i nen tal b ombers on t h e

negotiating table; the United States was reluctant to do
so.

American negotiators pointed to the large number of

Soviet FBS weapons to justi fy U.S. deployment of such
systems, while also arguing that American lead in bombers
was of fset by the Soviet lead in ICBMs and SLBMs. 8
In the end, a compromise was reached on all the
m ajor issues.

Two separate pac ts were prepared, a

per m anen t t rea t y on ABM sys tems, and a fi ve year
agree m e n t on o f fensi ve weapons, designed so that a
fol low-up treaty could be negotiated to establish more
permanent limits.

Both agreements were accompanied by a

number of "agreed statements" that laid out common under
standi ngs between the two countries and helped clari fy

speci fic provisions of the pact.9

8smoke, op. cit., pp. 15 8 -9.

9 Mayer, Teena, Understanding Nuc lear Weapons and
Arms Cont rol , (New York: Pergamon-Brassey Publishers,
1986), pp. 79-80.
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The ABM Pact
The ABM tr eaty consisted of sixteen articles,
several of which are worth closer examination.

Article

T w o defines a n A B M system as "a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their components in
f l i g ht t r ajectory" which c onsists of inter cept or
missiles, missile launchers, and ABM radars.

Article

Three allows for two ABM sites to be established in each
country, one in the area of the capital, the other around
one or more ICBM silo launchers.

Each system could be no

more than one hundred and fifty kilometers from the area
it was designed to defend, and the two systems had to be
at least thirteen hundred kilometers apart, so as not to
create a regional defense system, or the beginning of a
nationw ide system.

Further more, no more than one•

hundred missiles and missile launchers could be deployed
at each site.
Rapid reloading of the ABM launchers, and air, sea,
and space-based ABM systems were banned under Article
Five, while Article Nine prohibited the selling, trans
ferring, or giving of ABMs or ABM technology to other
nations.

Article Twelve dealt with a topic vital to arms

contro 1 agreements:

verification.

Under the terms of

the ABM treaty, and similar to terms found in other arms
control agreements,

"national technical means of

13
verification" were to be used to verify provisions of the
accord.

By national technical means, the signatories had

in mind electronic means of verification, such as space
based satellites, monitoring stations located either in
the home countries themselves or in third nations, or
other intelligence gathering equipment such as the
American SR-71 "spy plane."

Both parties also pledged

not to deliberately conceal information or interfere with
the means of verifying the pact.
unlimited duration.

The treaty was to be of

Article Fifteen, however, allowed

for either or both parties to withdraw from the pact
after a six month notice period, if they felt their
national interests were threatened due to an "extra
ordinary event" connected with the treaty's provisions.10
The Interim Agreement
The interim agreement on offensive weapons was only
half as long as the ABM treaty, but it aroused a great
deal more controversy in the United States.

To aid in

understanding why the agreement met with such opposition,
see Table 1.

The United States and the Soviet Union were

limited for fi v e years to the number of offensive
strategic nuclear missiles each had deployed or under
c onstruction as of the date of the signing of the
agreement.

lOu.s. ACDA, op. cit., p. 135.
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Table 1
SALT I Limitations
ICBMS

SLBMS

SUBS

U.S. Deployed

1054

656

41

U.S. Limits

1054

710

44

Deployed

1618

740

56

Limits

1618

950

62

s.u.
s.u.

As can be seen, the Soviet Union was allowed to
deploy a larger number of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as a
greater number of missile launching submarines than the
United States.

Both nations were allowed to increase the

n u m ber of d e p l oyed SLBMs t o the S A L T I limit,
dismantling an equal number of old ICBMs.

by

Both parties

w e r e pledged under Articles On e a n d Three of the
agreement not to start the construction of new ICBMs or
SLBMs after signing the pact, subject to the ICBM-SLBM
trade-off agreement mentioned above.11
Senate Consideration
When the interim agreement was introduced into the
U.S. SEnate, it immediately ran into stiff opposition
from a number of senators.

llu.s.

Many of them complained that

ACDA, op. cit., p. 150.
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the pact was unfair since it gave the Soviet Union an
advantage in the number of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as in
the number of missile launching submarines they could
deploy.

Supporters countered with argument that the

A me r i c a n a d v a n t a g e in intercontinental b o mbers,
approximately 5 2 0 to the Soviet Union's

1 40,

outweighed

this discrepancy; this reasoning still failed to win
enough support to ensure the agreement's passage.
It was then that Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.),
an ex pert on nati onal security affairs,

offered a

he sponsored an amendment that any

compromise proposal:

future SALT agreement would have to contain the principle
of "essential equivalence."
defined by J a c k s o n ,

This idea, only partially

ma ndated an overall numerical

equality in the number of strategic delivery systems both
nations possessed.

While vague, this proposal was enough

to persuade wavering senators to support passage of the
SALT I accord.

This compromise did not bode well for the

future of arms control, however; "essential equivalence"
was a doctrine that could be interpreted in more than one
way, and could be difficult to achieve.

For instance,

American missiles were more accurate; Soviet missiles
carried larger warheads;

how was equivalence to be

determined between these two variables? 12
12 smoke,

op. cit., pp.

1 60- 1 61.

CHAPTER IV
MIRVs AND THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORDS
Before continuing with an examination of the SALT II
pact, mention should be made of two events that preceded
this second major arms control agreement.

The first was

the technological breakthrough that led to the deployment
of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
(MIRVs) on American, then Soviet, Missiles.

The second

was the so-called Vladivostok Accord, singed between
Soviet G en e ra l Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and
President Gerald Ford in the late fall of 1974.

Each of

these events affected the future of the proposed SALT II
accord.

MIRV technology added a new complication to

ensuring the Jackson doctrine of essential equivalence
would be written into the proposed treaty, while the
Vladivostok Accord helped clarify negotiating parameters
for each side.
MIRV Technology

MIRV technology had been researched since the late
1960s, first in the United States and later in the Soviet
Union.

In the early 1970s the Americans began to deploy

MIRVed warheads on both their SLBMs and ICBMs.
16

In part

17
this helped offset the growing Soviet advantage in the
number of missiles each side was deploying, and was meant
to counter the possibility that the Soviets would develop
nationwide ABM network that could threaten the American
assured destruction capability, the basis of deterrence.
By developing a large number of M!RVed missiles the
United States could offset the advantage of a Soviet ABM
system by being able to launch a far greater number of
warheads than the Soviets could hope to shoot down.

This

also helped keep American defense expenditures at a more
reasonable level, since it was far cheaper to build and
deploy a large number of warheads than an equal number of
single warhead missiles.
The development o f MIRVed missiles,

how e ver,

complicated the planning for arms control negotiations.
The United States, knowing that it had a three to five
year lead over the Soviet Union in MIRV technology, and
interested in rectifying a perce ived imbalance in
strategic weapons, was committed to deploying MIRVed
missiles.

Once the United States had completed its

testing program and began to deploy MIRVed warheads, the
Soviet Union refused to consider any ban on the testing
or deploying of MIRVs.

It quickly became impossible to

limit the number of MIRVs, leaving open for negotiation
only a 1 imi t on the number of missiles carrying MIRVs.
After the acceptance of the Jackson amendment, MIRVs also

18

appeared as a possible answer to the problem of ensuring
essential equivalence for the United States - but even
this possibility was threatened by the Soviet deployment
o f MIRVe d m i s s i l e s t h a t b e g a n d u r i n g t h e F o r d
administration. 13
Following the resignation of �resident Nixon in
1 974,

the Ford administration decided to press ahead with

the secon d stage of SALT talks.
comp romise w o rke d out in

1

Subsequent to the

97 3 -7 4 between the two

negotiating teams, the Ford administration continued to
compromise on the subject of negotiations.

SALT I had

excluded both intercontinental bombers and forward based
systems but the Soviet Union continued to press for their
inclusion.

The United States eventually agreed to the

Soviet demand in the matter of FBS but it steadfastly
refused to yield on the subject of SAC bombers. In going
halfway, the U.S. achieved that part of the Jackson
doctrine that called for numerical equality in the number
of launch vehicles.
Since the Soviet Union was not inclined to destroy
already-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the 500 or so American
long-range bombers made the two sides' forces roughly
equal in number.

Excluding FBS weapons also allowed both

parties to sidestep the thorny issue of placing limits
13Mayers,

op. cit., pp. 80-8 1 .
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not only on American theater forces capable of reaching
the Soviet Union (the Soviet wish) but also of placing
l imits on Soviet theater weapons capable of hitting
targets in Western Europe, South Korea, and Japan (the
Ame r ican w ish).

By se tting up e nti rely se par ate

negotiations on these weapons, the ·whole question of
limiting tactical nuclear weapons could be sidestepped,
at least for a while. 1 4
The Vladivostok Accords
W h e n For d and B r ezhne v met in V lad ivostok in
Novembe r of

1 974

they we re thus able to sign a joint

accord that laid out the p r i n c i p les of a SALT II
agreement both confide ntly expected would be finished
within six months to a year's time.

The preliminary

levels set by the Accord were high; so high in fact, that
even after minor reductions called for were implemented
by both sides, each would still possess a larger nuclear
f or ce than be fore the SALT process had begun.
details of the Accord appear in Table 2.

14smoke, op. cit., pp.

1 69-17 1 .

The

20
Table 2
Launch Vehicle Limitations
Vehicle Type
Strategic Launch
U.S. Limit
S.U. Limit

2400
2400

MIRVed

1320
1320

New ICBM launchers were banned, and it was decided
that

t h e new agreement would rung th rough

1985.

Negotiations for the SALT II treaty seemed well within
reach, but two problems arose that complicated matters.
The issue of c ruise missiles was first; these were
relatively small missiles that flew at an extremely low
altitude and were thus able to avoid radar detection.
Capable of carrying a warhead over thousands of miles and
delivering it with great accuracy,

the cruise was a

formidable weapon, difficult to shoot down and far less
expensive than a standard ballistic missile or a long
range bomber.

The Soviets, knowing that the United

States had a sizable lead on them in the development and
deployment of these weapons, demanded that any cruise
missile with a ranger greater than 600 kilometers be
counted as a strategic launch vehicle and come under the
2 400 limit for such vehic les,
V ladivostok Accord.

as agreed to in the

This the United States refused to

21
concede to. 15

The second major obstacle to an early

agreement was the development of a new Soviet bomber,
called the "Backfire" in the United States.

This new

addition to the Soviet arsenal began to enter active
service in late

1 974

and a debate immediately began over

just what kind of plane it was. 1 6

The Soviets contended that it was a medium range
bomber since it could not fly round-trip missions to the
United States without being refueled in mid-flight.
American negotiators countered with the argument that the
new bombers' range could be extended by such refueling
t echniques exactly like the American B-5 2 which was
c o u n t e d a s a lo n g - r a n g e bomber by both s i d es.
Alternatively, the Soviet bomber could fly a one-way
mission and land in Cuba or some other nearby country to
refuel before flying back to the Soviet Union.

The

United States had similar bases in the Far East and in
Turkey, for use by the B-5 2 in wartime.

Therefore,

Americ a n negotiators demanded that the Backfire be
counted as a strategic launch vehicle and that it come
under the Acc ord's limits.

The Soviets refused to

concede this and the deadlock continued throughout

1 975.

lSirwin, Wall, (Ed.), SALT II: Toward Security or
Danger, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1979), pp.
6-7.
1 6Ibid.,

pp. 6-7.
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With the arrival of 1976 a bitter primary fight developed
b e twe en For d and his Republican challenger, former
Ca 1 ifornia governor Ronald Reagan.

The president, hard

pressed by his opponent, found it impossible to offer any
possible concessions on the bomber issu e for fear of
losing ground - and possibly his party 1 s nomination - to
Reagan.

CHAPTER V
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
Ultimately, Ford's reelection bid was unsuccessful,
and January 1977 saw the inauguration of a new president,
the former governor of Georgia, Democrat Jimmy Carter.
The new chief executive was strongly committed to the
a r m s control process, and he appointed a number of
ad visors (equally committed to SALT) to high positions
with the new administration.17

These included Secretary

of State C y r u s Vance, and Pau l Warnke, chief SALT
negotiator and head of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.

Both men were dedicated to the concept of arms

control and had a less fearful view of the Soviet Union
and its intentions than some of the officials in the
Nixon and Ford administrations.

Basic differences in the

negotiating positions of the Ford and Carter adminis
trations are examined in a later chapter.
Early Carter Proposals
In March 1977, in an effort to break the deadlocked
talks, Carter sent Vance to Moscow with two proposals to
17 Lehman, John and Weiss, Seymour, Beyond the SALT
II Failure, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 186.
23
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present to the Soviet government.

The first proposal was

d r a w n l a r g e l y f r o m the t w o and a h a l f year old
Vladivostok Accord, and retained the numerical limits on
s t rategic weapons whil e d e f e rring talks on cruise
missiles and the Backfire bomber until a later date.

The

Soviets rejected this proposal on the grounds that the
A merican lead in cruise missile technology gave the
United States a military advantage over the Soviet Union.
The second proposal was more bold and innovative.
In it, the United States proposed the following:
1.

Each nation's strategic launcher totals would be

reduced to either 2200 or 1800 from the current accepted
ceiling of 2400.
2.

MIRV limits would be cut from 1320 to 1200 or

3.

The sublimit (see Appendix B) on MIRVed, ICBM

1100.
launchers would be lowered from 820-550.
4.

All Sov i e t SS-17s,

1 8s,

and 19s would be

included in the 550 sublimit mentioned above.
5.

The Soviet Union could deploy only 150 Modern

Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs), instead of their then
deployed total of 308.
6.

Both sides would freeze deployment of existing

ICBMs, ban modification programs of existing ICBMs, and
ban the deployment of all new ICBMs.
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7.

No mobile ICBMs could be tested, developed, or

deployed.
8.

Each side cou 1 d ho 1 d no more than six flight

tests annually for both ICMBs and SLBMs.
9.

Al 1 cruise missiles with a range greater than

2500 kilometers would be banned from deployment on a non
heavy bombers.
10.

Cruise missiles with a range greater than 600

kilometers would be banned from deployment on non-heavy
bombers.
11.

The Soviet Union would be required to provide

assurances that the Backfire bomber could not be deployed
against the United States.
12.

Building new ICBM launchers at new locations

would be prohibited. 18

The Soviet Union rejected this proposal.

Moscow

argued that it was unfair because it restricted the
deployment of thei r ICBM system w ithout i m posing
restrictions on U.S. SLBMs.

The greater part of the

existing Soviet nuclear arsenal was tied up in land-based
ICBMs; United States forces were more evenly distributed
among the three legs of the nuclear triad.

Though

Vance's trip was clearly a failure, neither side was
willing to forego negotiations, which resumed in Geneva
18Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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some time later.

The bold, innovative second proposal of

March was quickly abandoned by the Carter administration

in favor of more "realistic offers."19

As the fall of 1977 approached, the expiration date
of the five year interim agreement on SALT I began to
loom.

First the United States, then -the Soviet Union,

announced they would continue to abide by the terms of
the agreement, provided that the other party agreed to do
so.

Over the next year and a half of negotiations, terms

were set on the structure of the proposed SALT II
agreement.

A three-tired system was established that

allowed for different issues to be treated in different
ways.

Most of the issues would be settled using the

Vla d ivostok Accord which called for sub-ceilings on
certain delivery systems.

Several more contentious

i s s u e s w e r e m a d e t h e su bject of a shorter-term
agreements, while a third document covered the status of
the Backfire bomber.

At this time it seems appropriate

to summarize the relevant articles of the SALT II treaty
as it was singed in June 1979.

19smoke, op. cit., p. 174; Lehman and Weiss, op.
cit., p. 16.

CHAPTER VI
THE SALT II TREATY
Selected Articles
Article Two dealt with the basic terminology that
wo uld be used thro ughout t h e treaty.

It provided

definitions for a number of weapon delivery systems, such
as ICBM, SLBM, cruise missile, and heavy bombers.

This

was importa nt, as b o t h parties ne eded to agree on
identical meanings for key concepts discussed in the
pact.
SLBMs,

Article Three specified the total number of ICBMs,
heavy bom bers, and Air to Surface Ballistic

Missiles (ASBMs) both sides could deploy when the treaty
w e n t into effect.

Paragraph two of t hat article

discussed the minimal cuts each side would make after a
set period of time.

This article showed how the Carter

administration's high hopes for large scale reductions in
arma m e nts had to be reduc ed in the face of Soviet
opposition.

Instead of the 15 to 20 percent cut in

stra t e g ic la unc hers e nvisioned in the March 1977
proposal, the United States had to be satisfied with a
cut of just over five percent.

Even this reduction was

delayed in order to give the Soviet Union time to phase
27
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out its older missiles and bombers, as it apparently had
already planned to do. 20
Artie le Four was one of the most important in the
treaty.

It began with a pl edge by both sides not to

build any new, or relocate any old, fixed ICBM launchers.
The article did not ban the construction of new missiles,
only of new missile launchers.

Both parties pledged not

to develop or deploy any new heavy ICBMs, defined as
those missiles that "have a launch weight greater than,
or a throw weight greater than
deployed by either Party."
section 7).

• the heavy ICBMs

(SALT II treaty, Article IV,

Since the Soviet Union was the only party

that possessed a large number of such missiles, this
paragraph could be construed as being one-sided, in that
it prevented the United States from building up its
dwindling, aging fleet of heavy ICBMs to match the 308
new ones the Soviet Union had deployed.

Each side was,

however, allowed to develop and deploy one new type of
light ICBM, although it was the opinion of Warnke that
particular clause could have been dropped from the treaty
had the United States insisted upon it.

Instead, the

deployment option was maintained, in order to provide

20 u.s.

ACDA, op. cit., pp.

2 47- 2 53.

29

s om e flexibi lit y i n fut ure deployment decisions. 2 1
Neither side was allowed to deploy more than ten warheads
on any ICBM, fourteen warheads on any SLBM, or 28 cruise
missiles on any long-range bomber.

This article had the

effect of placing at least some limits on the number of
warheads deployed by each side. 22
Article Five deals with another crucial topic:

the

s ub limits placed on the various types of strategic
delivery vehicles that each side could deploy.

The

following chart, based on i n f o rm ation provided in
A r t i c l e s T h r ee a n d

F i v e,

m ay p r o v e u s e f u l i n

understanding the various limits:
1.

198 2 t ot al of c ombi ned s t rat egi c nuclear

delivery vehicles - ICBM s, SLBM s, heavy bombers, and
ASBMs, 2250.
2.

Sublimit I:

of the

22 50

total, neither side may

have more than a combined total of 13 20 of the following
types:
(_a

Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

(_b

Launchers of MIRVed SLBMs.

(c

Heavy bombers equi p ped with long-range
cruise missiles.

2 1Minnice,

Choices,
11.

Karen, (Ed.), SALT II: F acts, Values,
(Midwest: World Without War Council, 1979), p.

22 u.s.

ACDA, op. cit., pp.

2 5 3-2 57.
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d.
3.

MIRVed ASBMs.

Sublimit II:

of the subtotal of 1320, neither

side may deploy more than a combined total of 1200 of the
following types:
(a
(b

4.

Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.
;

l Cj

Launchers of MIRVed SLBMs.
MIRVed ASBMs.

Sublimit III:

of the subtotal of 1200, neither

side may deploy more that 820 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.
The highest limits were placed on weapons that were
considered to be the least destabilizing, namely unMIRVed
ICBMs and bombers not equipped with cruise missiles.

The

lowest limit was put on the weapon category the United
Sta tes viewed as the most threatening:

MIRVed ICBMs.

Interes tingly, each side was allowed to "trade down"
between sublimits.

For example, fewer ICBMs might be

deployed in favor of more SLBM launchers, as long as the
two

c a t e g ories

t og e t h e r d i d

not

exceed

1200.

Alternatively, more bombers equipped with cruise missiles
could be deployed as long as fewer ICBMs and SLBMs were
deployed, and as long as the combined total did not
exceed 1320.23

Ar tic l e Six attemp ted to lay out guidelines to
ensure that delivery systems not covered by the initial
23u.s. ACDA, op. cit., pp. 259-260; Irwin, op. cit.,
pp. 22-23.
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terms of the treaty could not be converted into systems
that would be qualitatively better and still remain
outside the agreement.

It also defined what different

stages of devel opment arms systems could be in to be
counted under the treaty at the time it was scheduled to
go into effect.

As shown in paragraphs· two through five,

attention was even given to defining what constituted a
c onverted or completed submarine,

ICBM,

or an ASBM

equipped bomber. 24
A study of the first several articles of the SALT II
treaty reveals several references to Article Nine.

This

article deals with a variety of missile basing modes both
parties wished to ban or restrict.

Seabed or space-based

weapons were strictly prohibited, as was the testing and
deployment of long-range MIRVed cruise missiles.

Future

deployment of SLBMs and ASBMs were limited to missiles no
larger than the light ICBMs both sides had deployed as of
the spring of 1979.

By banning the deployment of heavy

mobile ICBMs a s well as space and water-bed based
ballistic and cruise missiles, both sides apparently
s o u g h t t o a v o i d ext e n ding t h e arms race in n e w
directions, as well as restricting the deployment of
ICBMs in modes that would make them harder to detect,
thus

je o p a r d izi n g t h e s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e .
24

u.s.

ACDA, op. cit., pp.

2 60- 2 61.

The
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restricti ons on long-range air-based MIRVed cruise
missiles helped reassure thee Soviet Union, which stil 1
1 agged behind the United States in both cruise missile
and MIRV techn o l o gies, that the Americans wo uld be
prevented from deploying a weapon the Soviets regarded as
destabilizing. 25
Finally, Article Fifteen refers to one of the most
delicate parts of any arms control treaty--verification.
The SALT I I acco rd,

1 ike its predecessor, was to be

v e r i f i e d t h r o u g h "na t i o n a l t e c hn i c a l m e ans o f
verification"; this refers to space-based satellites, and
air and shipbo rne electronic equipment, as well as a
limited number of ground-based monitoring stations.

The

treaty specifically pro hibits deliberate interference
with the collection of data necessary to help verify the
treaty, or to us "deliberate concealment measure" which
could also interfere with data collection.
A problem arises however with the second "common
understanding" to the third paragraph of this article.
In it, both parties agree they are free to use different
methods of transmitting data, including the encryption of
such information.

This encryption involves transmitting

the data in code, in order to foi 1 attempts by another

25 u.s.

pp. 2 2- 2 3.

ACDA, op. cit., pp.

2 64- 2 6 5 ;

Irwin, op. cit.,
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country to translate the information. 26

This proviso

wo u l d s e e m to c o n t r a d i c t the ban on delib erate
concealment measures contained in the text of the treaty.
This concern, among others, relating to verification, was
raised by opponents of the treaty during its consider
ation by the SEnate, and will be examined in a subsequent
chapter.
The SALT II Protocol
Attention will now be given to the shorter term
protocol that was also signed in June 1979.

This

document also placed certain limits on the deployment of
certain types and classes of weapons, although these
limitations were for a shorter period of time than those
set by the formal treaty.

This apparently reflected the

desires of both parties to keep their deployment options
open during the early 1980s.

The two most important

clauses in the protocol were the bans on the deployment
o f sea-launched and land-launched cruise missiles
equipped with either single warheads or MIRVs, and the
bans on the deployment of mobile ICBMs and ASBMs.

At the

time the protocol was signed, neither side had either
mobile ICBMs or long-range and sea- and ground-launched
cruise missiles, nor could either have deployed them
u.s. ACDA, op. cit., pp.
cit., p. 16 .
26

2 66- 26 7;

Minnice, op.

34

before the expiration of the protocol.

No restrictions

were placed on the range, development, flight-testing, or
deploying of air-launched cruise missiles, which the
United States viewed as crucial i n e x tending t h e
usefulness of American long-range bombers. 27
The Backfire Statement
Finally, there was the matter of the Soviet Backfire
bomber .

Mention has already been make of the dispute

over whether to count this pane as an intermediate or
long-range bomber, and how the decision was made to count
it under the former category.

At the conclusion of the

SALT II negotiations, the Soviet delegation issued a
statement that declared the Soviet government would not
increase the then current rate of production of the plane
( be 1 ieved by the United States to be about thirty per
year), and not deploy it in those parts of the Soviet
Union where its range would make it most effective in
striking American targets.

This commitment has the same

force as both the treaty and the short term protocol in
the eyes of the United States; thus, if the Soviet Union
were to violate the terms of the statement, the United

27 M1nn1ce,
·
·

op. c1· t., p. 1 7 •
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States would have grounds for charging the Soviets with a
violation of the SALT II treaty. 28
Potential Impact of SALT II
What was the impact of the agreement in light of the
strategic positions of both the United States and the
Soviet Union in the late 1970s?
1.

To begin with, both countries were limited as to

the number of warheads they could deploy on their ICBMs
and SLBMs, these numbers begin ten and fourteen per
missile, respectively.

This was designed to prevent

either side from "loading up" their missiles with twenty
or thirty lower yield MIRVed warheads, and especially
affected the Soviet Union, which had begun testing its
ICBMs with these larger payloads.

The problem with this

limitation was that it was impossible to verify through
normal means that the warhead limits were actually being
observed.

Assuming that both sides did abide by the

terms of the treaty, however, it would place a definite
limit on the total number of strategic warheads deployed
by the two superpowers.
2.

The throw weigh t--the combined weight of al 1

warheads, guidance equipment, and penetration aids-
carried by each ICBM and SLBM was limited to that of the
2 8 Irwin,
·

·
op. cit.,
p.

24

·
·
; M1nn1ce,
op. c1. t ., p. 16 .
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largest missile each side had deployed at the time of the
treaty.

This would prevent either party from deploying

larger missiles

(in theory)

that could carry a larger

number of more powerful warheads.
3.

In addition, during the life of the treaty

neither side could deploy more than one new type of ICBM,
a n d this additio n had t o f all into the light ICBM
category.

This new� should be distinguished from a

new generation of missile, the later being merely a newer
version of an already existing missile type, with similar
pay 1 oad and propulsion characteristics.

This limit to

one new type would effectively prevent either side from
deploying a new heavy ICBM, capable of carrying a large
number of heavy yield (megaton range) warheads.

At the

time the treaty was signed, it was assumed that the
Soviet Union would deploy a new single warhead missile to
replace its older SS-9s and lls.

The United States was

a l r e a d y c o m m i tt ed to the deployment of the Missile
Experimental, MX missile, designed to carry ten MIRVed
warheads, the maximum allowable payload under the terms
of the treaty.

The MX was originally designed to be a

mobile missile; it was hoped that by deploying such a
weapon, the deterrence value of the land-based leg of the
nuclear triad would be greatly enhanced.
4.

Neither country, in the short term, would be

allowed to deploy a mobile IBCM, which each side had the
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capabi 1 i ty of doing in the long term--the Soviet Union
with its SS-16 missile, the United States with its MAP
basing mode for the MX.

This restriction would only

apply through the end of 1981, however, when the protocol
to the treaty would expire.

As a mobile basing mode made

the task of tracking and targeting a·n ICBM harder,
it
•
would be preferred basing mode for each side; thus each
part gained and lost by the decision to ban such basing
modes in the short term.
5.

Long-range bombers carrying long-range air

launched cruise missiles

(ALCMs) were included in the

1320 sublimit on offensive delivery systems, along with
MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs.

Since the latter two categories
•

have a combined permissible total deployment of 1200, the
United States would be prevented from deploying more than

... on its
120 ALCM-equipped bombers without scaling back
deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The Soviet Union, lagging

appr o x i m ately three to five years behind on cruise
missile technology, would be faced with the same dilemma.
Whether either side would choose to sacrifice any of
their MIRVed ballistic missiles was debatable; these
weapons were generally regarded as high priority for
deployment, and would not be given up without good cause.
On the other hand, 120 ALCM-equipped bombers would
constitute a formidable second-strike weapon in their own
right.

With each bomber carrying 28 cruise missiles, and
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assuming that only half survived a first strike, that
would still leave either side with slightly over 1500
accurate,

though low-yield, warheads for use in a

retaliatory strike.

Thus, the treaty limits the number

of ACLM-equipped bombers both sides could deploy; yet
each was still allowed a significant number of such
strategic launch vehicles.

The Soviet Union undoubtedly

benefitted more than the United States, however; the
comprehensive Soviet air defense network would have a far
easier time of tracing and destroying incoming American
bombers than the almost non-existent American air defense
system.
6.

The SALT II treaty did not cover so--called

"grey area" weapons syst�ms that both sides deployed
around the world.

The small British and French nuclear

arsenals, American nuclear-equipped FB-111 bombers, 100
Soviet intermediate range SS-20 missiles, and a number of
medium range Soviet bombers were all excluded from the
agreement.

CHAPTER VII
CARTER NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
The negotiating positions assumed by the Ford and
Carter administrations require the realization that there
were differences between them in their pursuit of
strategic arms reduction.

Ford and his Secretary of

State, Kissinger, developed a balanced group of advisors
to aid them in strategic negotiations.

Carter, on the

o ther han d , staffed every subcabinet post of SALT
significance with disarmament advocates.

No conserv-

atives, Democrat or Republican, were to be found among
t h e inner circle of Carter's SALT advisors.

An

examination of the two administrations' negotiating
p o si t i o n s ,

whi l e cer t ain l y s h o wing evidence of

continuity, also reveals a number of differences on
several key issues.

The Carter administration revealed a

wi l lingn e s s t o make uni l a t e r a l co ncessions and
compromises in pursuit of disarmament.
This disarmament advocacy began to make itself
apparent early on in the Carter administration.

After

the Soviet rejection of the second proposal of March,
1977--which had enjoyed strong bipartisan support from
C o n gr e s s-- t h e C a r ter administration seemed mo re
39
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interested in making concessions aimed at winning Soviet
approval than in negotiating from a position of strength.
For example, the treaty's positions on the cruise missile
and the Backfire bomber were in line with Soviet demands
on topics, as was the position on the issue of heavy
ICBMs, as well as the decision to permit the encryption
of missile test data.

At the same time, the Carter

administration made several strategic decisions that
delayed or eliminated programs aimed at aiding in the
American strategic buildup.

First came the shutting down

of the Minuteman III production line, followed by the
slowdown of the MX program, cancellation of the Thomahawk
cruise missile and the B-1 bomber, and a slowdown in the
Trident submarine program .

None of these unilateral

concessions at the negotiating table or at the Pentagon
met with Soviet reciprocation.29
T h e following is a comparison of the strategic
programs and

pol ic i e s of t h e

Ford and Carter

administrations (see Table 3), based on data presented at
both the negotiating table and to Congress.3 0

29Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
30Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., pp. 17-21.
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Table 3

Comparison Chart
ISSUE

CARTER

FORD

I of strategic
launchers
I of MIRVed systems

2400 at first;
2250 by Dec. 1982
1320, including B-52s
w/ALCMs
1200

2150
Same

Limit on MIRVed ICBMs
and SLBMs
Limit on MIRVed ICBMs

820

Limit on MLBMs

Soviets-308, U.S.-none

Mobile basing for ICBMs

No sublimit;
freedom to mix
No sublimit;
freedom to mix
Same

Prohibited by the Protocol

New ICBM types

No restrictions

,U.S.-one new type
s:u.-one new type
plus 2 being deployed

No restrictions

New ballistic missile
submarines

No restrictions, Trident
Trident program delayed

Same, no delay
in Trident program

New SLBMs

B-1
Backfire
ACLMs

Sea Launched Cruise
Missiles (SLCMs)

Ground Launched Cruise
Missiles (GLCMs)
Older strategic bombers

No restrictions, reduce
funding Trident II
Cancelled
No limitation

Banned on non-heavy bombers
On heavy bombers, bomber
counts in MIRV totals
No more than 28 ALCMs per
plane
Nuclear and conventional
ACLMs restricted
Restrict sharing of
technology w/NATO

Deployment banned except
SLCMs w/a range under 600 km
Nuclear and conventional
SLCMs restricted
Restrict technology sharing
w/NATO
Same as for SLCMs

Modified Soviet Bear and
Bison bombers do not count
against Soviet total
Mothballed U.S. B-52s
count against U.S. Total

Same; maintain for
funding for Trident II
Full production
Soviets limited to maxi
mum deployment of 275
Same
Same
No restrictions
on ACLMs
No restrictions
on conventionally
armed ACLMs
No restrictions on
technology sharing

Range Limited to 2500 km
No restrictions on con
ventionally armed SLCMs
No restrictions on tech
no 1 ogy sharing
Same as for SLCMs

Modified Bears and Bison
do count against Soviet
total
Mothballed B-52s do not
count against U.S. Total

CHAPTER VIII
SENATE CONSIDERATION
Finally, the SALT II treaty was submitted to the
U.S. Senate for ratification.

Initially, it was assigned

to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees,
where it was the subject of exhaustive scrutiny over a
period of several months.

John Lehman, a strategic

policy analyst, was witness to what he termed "The Great
SALT debate."

He writes:

Liter a lly hundreds of hours were spent by
administration and nongovernmental witnesses in
arguing the case for and against the treaty.
By the time the Senate went home for Thanks
giving recess in November, it had become clear •
• it would be impo ssible to obtain the
necessary two-thirds majority to ratify the
treaty in its existing form.31
Indeed, the Armed Services Committee issued its final
report on December 20, 1979, that rejected the treaty
wholesale, without a single dissenting vote.

It would

appear that the senators agreed with the conclusions of
the House Armed Services Committee panel that stated that
the treaty was:

"a cosmetic domestic political symbol,

31Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., p. 96.
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which neither limits strategic arms, enhances security,
deters war, nor maintains the strategic balance."32
Interestingly, opposition to the pact appeared to
come from two different sources within the Senate.
first,

and larger,

The

g r o u p was composed of those

conservative senators who opposed the treaty on national
security grounds.

Senators such as Jesse Helms (R.,

N. C.), Richard Lugar (R., Ind.), and Henry Jackson (D.,
Wash.) claimed that the accord was weighted in favor of
the Soviet Union, and did little, if anything, to improve
the security of the United States.

They advocated the

treaty's rejection, and called instead for a buildup of
American strategic nuclear forces.

The second group, led

by Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.), was smaller, and
was composed of a number of liberal senators who decried
the treaty as being a parody of real arms control.

This

group felt SALT II, like SALT I before it, imposed only
marginal constraints at best on the development of new
weapons systems.

Furthermore, whatever constraints were

imposed were purchased at the price of allowing the
military establishment on both sides to develop and build
new weapons systems, which would only further destabilize
the strategic balance between the two superpowers.

When

totaled together, representatives of both groups numbered
3 2Mo r r i s , C h a r l e s R . , I r o n Desti nies, L o st
Opportunities, (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 386.
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between for ty-five and fifty--well over the one third
plus one minority needed to defeat the treaty.

The

Soviet i n v a sion of Afghanistan in December of 1979
s pelled the end of SALT II in the United States; the
Senate was not inclined to ratify an arms agreement with
a nation that was in the process of in·vading one of its
neighbors.

When combined with alliance of conservatives

and liberals in the Senate who had originally opposed the
treaty, the Carter administration was forced to withdraw
the pact in January 1980.33

33Irwin,

cit., p. 96.

op. cit., pp. 27-28; Lehman and Weiss, op.

CHAPTER IX
SALT II:

STRATEGIC SURVIVAL OR SURRENDER?

It is now time to examine the SALT II treaty from a
strategic point of view, to look at the objectives and
assumptions of the SALT process and decide whether the
accord was a "good deal" for the United States or not.
It must be noted that this is difficult to determine.
O bv iously b o t h sid e s of the SALT d e b at e ad van ced
argume n t s that they felt were convincing, and that
effectively refuted the arguments put forward by their
opponents.

In this portion of the thesis, the main

assumptions of the SALT process will be listed, as well
as the primary objectives of the SALT II treaty itself.
Closer examination will then be given to each assumption
and objective, to se how much validity it had, and to
attempt to answer the basic question:

Would ratification

of SALT II, or rejection of it, be more likely to move
the United States away from the twin dangers of nuclear
instability on the one hand and political ascendancy by
the Soviet Union on the other--and thus towards greater
security?
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Assumptions and Objectives of the SALT Process
There were five assumptions made about the SALT
process that originated with the Nixon administration in
1969-70.
1.
2.

These were:
SALT would save money on defense spending.
SALT would slow or stop the development of

technology that would destabilize the military balance.
3.

SALT would increase military stability between

the superpowers.
4.

SALT w o u l d s l o w t h e n u c l e a r a r m s race

considerably.
5.

forces. 34

SALT would place a cap on Soviet strategic

Three basic objectives were also quickly established
for the SALT II treaty by President Nixon's original
negotiating team, in the aftermath of the SALT I
agreement; these objectives were accepted in turn by the
Ford and Carter administrations.
1.

They were:

Place equal limits on the nuclear capabilities

of both sides.
2.

Secure significant reductions in offensive

nuclear forces.
3.

Secure limits that were verifiable.35

34Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., p. 5.

35 Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., pp. 82-84.
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With these two lists in mind, it is now time to
examine the assumptions given above:
1.

The SALT process would save dollars:

The theory

behind this assumption was that as treaties limiting
nuclear weapons went into effect, this would result in a
savings in the annual defense budget.

Paul Warnke went

so far as to maintain that if the SALT process failed to
restrain the amount of money spent by the United States
on strategic weapons systems, the negotiators should be
sent "back to the drawing board." with instruction to do
their jobs better the second time around.

Three problems

arose concerning this assumption, however.
(_a

Strategic expenditures comprised less than ten

percent of the overall defense budget; thus the potential
f o r s a v i n g l a r g e a m o u n t s o f money was severely
restricted.
(_b

Bo th SALT I and SALT I I tended to exc 1 ude

strategic systems already on the drawing board.

Thus

'these systems, which comprised the bulk of the American
strategic budget, would not be eliminated, and the money
budgeted for them would be spent anyway.
�c

If the nuclear arsenals on both sides were to be

reduced,

i n c r e a s e d c o n v e n t i o n a l s pending w o uld

undoubtedly be called for, in order to compensate for the
per ceived conventional imbalance between the United
States and the Soviet Union.

Conventional weapons tend
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to be more expensive than strategic systems thus seeming
ly wiping out whatever minor savings might have occurred.
In short, by t h e late 1970s officials who had
confidently expected to realize defense savings were now
saying that this would not come about.
noted in the spring of 1978:

As Cyrus Vance

"the cost of an adequate

defense will remain high," and furthermore:

"for the

foreseeable future, arms control will not dramatically
reduce our defense budget."36

Liberal opponents of SALT

even charged that SALT would ultimately stimulate U.S.
strategic programs.

George Rathjens, a leading arms

control advocate, argued that new strategic systems were
bound to be developed as negotiations continued, either
to strengthen the negotiating position of one part or the
other, or to appease influential domestic groups, such as
the defense establishment or not appear as though this
first assumption was valid.3 7
2 •

S A L T w o u l d s l o w o r s t op t e c h n o l ogi cal

development:

.

This assumption has at least two problems

that a study of the SALT process reveals:

(1

No real restra ints were placed on weapons

technology as a result of SALT I or SALT II.

MIRVed

36vance, Cyrus, address to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, April, 1978, in Lehman and Weiss, op.
cit., p. 84.

37Rathjeans, George, in Lehman and Weiss, op. cit.,
p. 84.
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warheads, cruise missiles, improved targeting systems,
improved guidance systems--all were researched, developed
and deployed during the 1970s.

The cutting edge of tech

nology both sides sought to deploy tended to be protected
in two agreements reached during the period.

When

constraint was shown, it was quite often unilateral on
the part of the United States.

The cancellation of the

neutron warhead, the B-1 bomber, and the closing down of
the Minuteman III production line, as well as the slow
down of the MX and Thomahawk cruise missile programs--all
t ended to restrain American strategic technological
deployment, without any sign of Soviet reciprocity.
(b\•

The second problem with this assumption is that

it is self-defeating.

Restricting strategic technology

might not necessarily stabilize the military balance; a
case can be made that the improvements in technology have
proven to be more stabilizing than restrictions.
ex amp 1 e ,

For

the p 1 acing of ICBMs in underground si 1 os

removed for over a decade the threat of their being
destroyed in a first strike.

Initially deployed in a

soft, above ground configuration, these missiles were
extremely vulnerable to a preemptive attack.

By moving

them into hardened underground silos (a technological
breakthrough), ICBMs became more secure, removing the
necessity to "use them or lose them" in the event of
nuclear crisis.

Improvements in the SLBMs also increased
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the security of the sea-based leg of the strategic triad,
thus enhancing strategic stability.

The development of

Permissive Action Links (PALs), a computerized device
that prevents the unauthorized launching of an ICBM, is
another example of how technological development helped
s t abilize the strategic balanc e.

In essence, the

restraining, or cutting off entirely, of technological
development should be viewed as misguided at best, and
dangerous at worst. 38
3•

SALT increases military stability:

Those who

support the SALT process claimed that the chance of war
was lessened and strategic stability enhanced by the
acceptance of SALT, and in particular, SALT II.

The

problem with this arises when one realizes that if SALT
does not enhance strategic stability, the chance of war
is not reduced.

The question as to whether SALT II did

enhance strategic stability is open to question and will
be explored below.
4.

SALT will slow the arms race appreciably:

question immediately comes to mind:

The

"What arms race?"

The phrase conjures up and image of both superpowers
frantically building more and more missiles, bombers, and
submarines, each keeping pace with the other.

The fact

is that the Soviet Union engaged in these activities
38 Lehman

and Weiss, op. cit., pp.

8 4-86.
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throughout the 1970s, while the United States largely did
not.

The construction of manned bombers and ICBMs in

t h i s co untry was halted in 1967; the b uilding of
ballistic missile submarines continued, but slowed during
the 1970s.

The Soviet Union continued the rapid buildup

of all three types of delivery systems throughout the
same two decade period.

How could any SALT agreement end

a race that by any reasonable definition was no arms race
at all?

If SALT was intended to stop the Soviet Union,

or even force a retrenchment on their part, it failed
there as wel1. 39

That leads us to the final assumption

of the SALT process.
5.

SALT wi 1 1 p 1 ace a cap on Soviet strategic

forces:

If this were true, then an argument could be

made that the SALT process was worthwhile.
indeed the case?

But is this

As wi 11 be explored in this thesis,

there is little evidence to show that a cap of any sort
has been placed on the growth of Soviet strategic forces
as a result of the SALT process.

Long-range bombers,

ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines---all continue to
churn off Soviet production lines throughout the 1970s.

39Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., pp. 82-84.
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Objectives of the SALT Process
The t hree publicized objectives of the SALT II
treaty were as follows:
1.

Place equal limits on the nuclear capabilities

of both sides.
2.

Secure significant reductions in offensive

nuclear forces.
3.

Secure limits that were verifiable.

The fulfillment of these objectives served as the
whole raison d'etre for the pact, and failure to achieve
t h e m w o u l d s e em to undermine any reason f o r i t s
acceptance.

With this 1 ist in mind, it is now time to

further examine these objectives:
1.

SALT II will place equal limits on both sides

nuclear capabilities:

This was supposed to be accom

plished by establishing clearly defined limits on the
number of launch vehicles each side co uld possess-
ICBMs, S LBMs,

ASBMs,

and intercontinental bombers.

Certain categories of weapons and certain specific types
of delivery systems were exempt from this process; this
led to criticism by opponents of the treaty, as will be
discussed later.
Advocates of the SALT pact argued that the treaty
achieved t his objective thro u gh t h e c eilings a nd
subceilings imposed by the agreement.

They also argued,
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as Paul Warnke did, that without the treaty, the Soviet
Union would deploy far more delivery systems than the
225 0 allowed by the treaty--possibly as many as 3 000 or
3 500, by 19 8 5 •

They also argued that the Soviets would

be forced to dismantle some 250 delivery systems in order
to meet the treaty's target figures,- while the United
States, with approximately 2050 such systems, would have
the abi 1 i ty to increase its strategic forces under the
terms of the overall ceiling. 40
The restraints placed on launchers are real; of that
there can be no doubt.

The question arises when one

considers the number of warheads each side possessed at
the time.

In 1979 the United States had 105 4 ICBMs,

carrying approximately 2100 warheads.

The Soviet Union

had 1 400 ICBMs equipped with approximately 7000 warheads;
in megatonnage, the Soviets held a lead of approximately
five to one.

In addition, 3 0 8 of the Soviet ICBMs were

in the so-called heavy category, carrying ten one-megaton
MIRVed warheads each; the United States was barred by
SALT II from deploying anything comparable.

These heavy

ICBMs were excellent first strike weapons, powerful and
accurate enough to destroy even the hardened silos that
housed the American ICBM force--and yet these missiles
4 0Rostow, Eugene, "The Case Against SALT II", in
Lineberry, William, (Ed.), Arms Control, (New York: H. w.
Wi 1 son Co. , 1979), p. 19 4.
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represented less than twenty-five percent of the Soviet
ICBM force. 41

And while it is true the Soviet Union was

obliged to dismantle approximately 250 launchers to meet
the treaty's terms, the most obvious choice for such
dismantling were their oldest ICBM systems, which were
rapidly becoming obsolete.
In SLBMs, the Soviet lead was 950 to 62 4 for the
United States.

While approximately 500 of the United

States' SLBMs were MIRVed, compared to half as many for
the Soviet Union, the latter still held a four to one
advantage in the number of ballistic missile submarines
it was allowed to deploy, a limit of 62, while compared
to the American limit of 44_42

The question of long-range bombers is more difficult
t o determine.

By the terms of the treaty, the 31 6

American B-52s, and the 150 Soviet Bisons and Bears were
counted as being intercontinental bombers.

Excluded from

the treaty were 75 FB-llls deployed by the United States,
and approximately
Soviet Union.

140

Backfire bombers deployed by the

There was agreement that the FB-111 was a

medium range bomber, and therefore not subject to the
treaty's constraints; disagreement arose over the classi
fication of the Backfire.
41 Rostow,

The Soviet Union insisted that

in Lineberry, op. cit., pp.

42M1nn1ce,
·
·
·
op. cit.,
p. 39.

134-135.
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it was a medium range bomber as well, and the Carter
administration ultimately accep ted this declaration.
C ritics such as Henry Jackson charged that it was not,
however, and argued instead that it could assume an
intercontinental role with the aid of mid-air refueling-
like the B-52.

These critics further pointed to the fact

t h a t while the Carter administration had cancelled
production of the B-1, scheduled as the replacement of
the aging B-52, the Soviet Union was continuing steady
production of the Backfire.43
I n summary, was the objective of placing equal
l imits on b o t h sides nuclear capabilities actually
achieved?

The answer is an ambiguous yes and no.

While

an equal limit was placed on the number of launchers each
side could deploy, the Soviet Union had a clear advantage
in the number of warheads it had deployed.

In addition,

the exclusion of the Backfire bomber from the treaty
allowed the Soviets to deploy a plane that many critics
argued was a strategic weapon (see Appendix B), and thus
should have come under the terms of the pact.

In short,

the first objective of the treaty was achieved in only
the most technical of senses.
If equal limits were not effectively established,
then what about the second objective of the treaty?
43 u.s.

ACDA, op. cit., pp. 2143 -2144 .
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2.

SALT will achieve significant reduction in both

superpow ers'

stockpiles of strategic weapons:

The

o riginal proposal made by the Carter administration in
March 1977 might have led to the achievement of this
goal, but the proposal was withdrawn after sharp Soviet
criticism of it.

Instead, after another two years of

negotiations, the SALT II treaty was signed.

This had

the effect of reducing the number of strategic launch
vehicles by 250--all on the Soviet side--while allowing
them to continue the MIRVing of thei r ICBM and SLBM
fo rces, inc reasing the number of deployed warheads by
several thousand.

The United States, through the Carter

administration's decision to cancel or slow down a number
of strategic programs did delay any sharp increase in
A merican strategic weaponry, but did not reduce the
stockpile.

Thus, this key objective was clearly not

fulfilled.
Finally, attention must be paid to the third and
last principle objective to SALT II.
3.

SALT will secu re verifiable limits on both

sides' nuclear arsenals:

This was one of, if not the

most, hotly debated topics of the SALT II debate.

For

the record, it would be useful to examine the principal
points on verification covered by the SALT II accord.
Verification was to have been by national technical
m ea n s ,

i n c lu d i n g t h e u s e of spy planes,

p hoto-
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reconnaissance satellites, and ground-based monitoring
stati o n s .

B o th sides agreed not t o use deliberate

concealment methods that would impede verification, or to
interfere with each others' national technical means.
Counting Rules
Along with the verification procedures mentioned
above, certain counting and distinguishing rules were
written into the agreement along with certain constraints
on specific systems, all designed to aid in verification
of MIRV limits.

Both parties agreed that once a missile

had been tested with MIRVs, then all missiles of that
type were to be considered to be equipped with MIRVs,
whether they actually were or not.

In addition, if a

launcher contained or test-fired a MIRVed missile, then
all launchers of that type would be counted as launchers
of MIRVed missiles, and thus come under the 1320 sublimit
contained in the treaty.

A further constraint was sought

against the Soviet SS-16, an ICBM very similar to the
mobile SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).
Since the treaty prohibited the conversion of IRBM and
Medium Range Ballistic Missile

(MRBM)

launchers into

launchers for ICBMs, and since mobile ICBMs were also
prohibited, the Soviets agreed not to produce the SS-16,
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since it would be impossible to verify whether or not an
SS-20 launcher contained an SS-20 or an SS-16.44
Supporters of the SALT II agreement argued that its
verification measures were not only as good as could be
achieved through negotiation, they were also more than
adequate to ensure that the Soviets c·ould not cheat on
the treaty.

Ca rter,

i n a s peech given before the

American Newspaper Publishers Association in April 1979,
stressed the importance of verifiability in the accord.
He stated bluntly:
No objective has commanded more attention in
our negotiations. We have insisted that the
SALT II agreement be made verifiable. We are
confident that no significant violation of the
treaty could take place without the United
States detecting it.45
He went on to claim that photo-recon satellites could
accurately count the number of missile silos, submarines,
and long-range bombers deployed by the Soviet Union, each
backed up by ground-based observation stations, and other
"sensitive intelligence techniques" whose nature could
not be disclosed.

He concluded by claiming, as already

noted, that deliberate concealment measures by either
side were strictly prohibited under the terms of the
trea ty,

and that the two parties would provide one

.
·
44 Minnice,
op. ci·t., p. 11.

4 5ca r t e r ,

Ji m m y, A d d r e ss to the ANP A, from
Department of State Publication 8981, General Foreign
Policies Series No. 325, in Minnice, op. cit., p. 26.
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another with data on the numbers of strategic weapons
each had deployed, and the payload each carried--the
first time the Soviets had agreed to such an exchange of
data. 46
SALT advocates, like Paul Warnke and Jan Lodal,
s e ize d o n r e m a r k s like t h i s ,

a�d by o t h er top

administration officials, to argue that the pact was
s u fficie n t l y verifiab l e to w ar rant ratification.
National technical means, combined with other "sensitive
techniques" would enable American strategists to detect
any major violations of the pact in time to take
u n s p e c i fie d c o un t e r m easures.

I n addition,

this

reassurance would be reinforced by what they termed to be
a strong Soviet interest in abiding by the terms of the
accord and thus keeping the SALT process alive.
Treaty Loopholes?
In response to this, opponents of the SALT II pact
like Eugene Rostow and Henry Jackson raised a host of
objections, the essence of which was that the pact left
too many loopholes to be adequately verified.

Since it

c ould not be verifie d , it should therefore not be
ratified.

An example of their objectives would be the

article limiting missile launchers.
46 carter,

Contrary to popular

op. ci·t., i·n Mi'nni·ce , op . ci't . , p . 2 6 .
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belief, neither SALT I nor SALT II limited the number of
ballistic missiles either side could deploy; they limited
the number of missile launchers instead.

During the SALT

I negotiations this was seen as irrelevant, since once a
missile was fired the launcher became unusable.

However,

shortly after the SALT I accord was ratified, the Soviet
Union began the deployment of two new ICBMs, the SS-17
and the SS -18.

Both missiles used a "cold launch"

technique, wherein compressed gas was used to pop the
missile out of the silo before its engines were fired by
remote control.
repeatedly.47

This allowed a launch silo to be used

If the Soviet Union were to stockpile additional
missiles, this would give them an advantage in the number
of deployed ICBMs.

After all, critics argued, being able

to verify holes in the ground did not mean being able to
verify how many missiles the Soviets had actually build
and had ready for deployment.

Even though the treaty

prohibited this kind of stockpiling (Article IV, section
five, subsection b), this is inherently unverifiable;
without stringent on-site inspection of all 458 SS-17 and
SS-18 silo sites, it would be impossible to verify
whether or not the Soviets were stockpiling missiles in
excess of the treaty's limits.

Furthermore, the pact

47Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., p. 69.
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says nothing about the stockpiling of missiles at sites
other than missile silos.

Again, it would be impossible

to verify whether this was actually occurring without on
site inspection of the suspected areas.
Ambiguous Definitions
Loo se definition was another way the Soviets
attempted to circumvent the treaty, according to its
critics, such as Rostow and Jackson.

As an example, they

cited the agreement reached in the SALT I accord that
banned either side from deploying heavy ICBMs in light
ICBM launchers.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union refused

to join the United States in issuing a joint definitive
statement on precisely what constituted a heavy ICBM,
leading the Americans to issue a unilateral statement
saying that they understood a heavy ICBM to be "any ICBM
having a vo 1 ume significantly greater than that of the

largest ICBM now operational on either side."48

SALT

negotiator Gerald Smith even testified before Congress
that Soviet deployment of missiles bigger than their SS
lls in their light missile launchers would be regarded as

a violation of the SALT pact by the United States.49

4 8Labrie, Roger, (Ed.), SALT Handbook, (Washington
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 29.

49 u.s. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, SALT
and The U.S. Strategic Forces Budget, in Lehman and
Weiss, op. cit., p. 70.
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Shortly after the pact was ratified by the Senate
the Soviets began deploying SS-17 and SS-19 missiles in
SS-11 launch silos.

The SS-19 had a volume 53 percent

greater than the SS-11, and a throw-weight four to five
times as large.

The SS-17 had a throw-weight three to

four times as large.

SALT supporters were obliged to

argue that this did not violate the letter of the treaty;
SALT opponents claimed that there was no need to--the
treaty was so loosely worded that the Soviets did not
have to violate it in order to circumvent its intent.

In

SALT II, the same loose definition tactic was employed by
the Soviets to skirt around the clause limiting both
sides to the deployment of one new ICBM.

SALT opponents

charged the American negotiators with having accepted too
lo ose a definition of what constituted a new ICBM,
instead of insisting on a stricter definition.
Double-Use Objects
A final way the Soviets were alleged to have slipped
around verification guarantees was to build something
forbidden, or limited by the treaty, and then claim not
to use it in the manner that the treaty forbade.

As an

example, the Soviet Union began deployment of the SS-20,
and IRBM, in 1977.

Fully loaded, it fell just under the

minimum range limit for an ICBM as specified by SALT II.
If its payload were to be reduced, its range would be
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increased, making it capable of striking the United
Sates.
SALT II critics charged that it was impossible to
verify whether or not the SS-20 was equipped as an IRBM
or an ICBM, by the verification methods set out in the
treaty.

The same charge was leveled against the Backfire

bomber, which a number of reputable defense experts
claimed had an operational range of 8000 kilometers, far
exceeding the 5500 kilometer figure established by the
treaty as the minimal range for an intercontinental
bomber.50

And yet the Soviets insisted that the Backfire

was only a medium bomber, and therefore did not come
under the treaty's formal limits.

Without on-site

verification, the critics charged, there was no way to
determine whether or not the Soviets were telling the
truth.

In addition, the Soviet Union had test-fired

long-range ALCMs from the Backfire less than a week after
the Secretary of Defense stated that if the plane was
used as a tester or carrier of such missile, it would
have to come under the terms of the treaty.5 1

Again, it

was impossible to verify whether the Backfire was
equipped with the missiles or not, under the verification
procedures outlined in SALT II.
50Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., p. 75.
51Lehman and Weiss, op. cit., p. 77.
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The Soviets also constructed approximately 150
missile silos in violation of Article Four of the treaty.
The Soviets at first declined to say what the silos were
for, then claimed that they were command and control
facilities for other missile silos.

Unable to verify

whether or not this was indeed the case, the United
States accepted the Soviet claim at face value, ignoring
the possibility that the Soviets might be preparing to
deploy an additional 150 ICBMs, in clear violation of
SALT II.
Data Encryption
Finally, the problem of data encryption divided the
supporters and opponents of SALT II.

On one hand, the

treaty forbade the use of any concealment measures that
would interfere with the national technical means of
verification used to verify the terms of the pact.

On

the other hand, the treaty also permitted the parties to
use encryption during the transmitting of telemetric
information.

At first, the United States insisted that

encr yption not be a l l o wed;

i n the face o f S o v iet

resistance to this, the idea was dropped.

Telemetry

encryption denied the United States the ability, in part,
to verify the treaty; how could American analysts know
the content of the telemetry encrypted by the Soviets?
There is no way to t e l l , with any high degree of
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accuracy.

just what specific telemetric information the

Soviets were transmitting; the treaty thus sanctified a
method that could only be used to help evade its terms. 52

oavis, Jacquelyn, Friel, Patrick, and Pfaltzgraff,
Robert, SALT I I and U.S. - Soviet Strategic Forces,
(Cambridge, Mass,: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
19 7 9 ) , pp . 4 4-4 5 •
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS ON SALT II
The SALT II treaty was the crowning achievement of a
decade-long effort to achieve detente with the Soviet
Union.

Putting aside the question of how valid the

entire process of detente was, a far simpler one presents
itself; was the SALT II treaty, in its submitted form
worth the effort that had one into it?
f act,

Should it; in

h a v e been ratified b y the Senate?

T o its

supporters, the treaty was a useful step on the road to
controlling the arms race, a further strand in the web of
mutually beneficial agreements linking the United States
and the Soviet Union.

To its critics, the treaty was a

mockery of genuine arms control, full of loopholes that
would enable the Soviets to violate the spirit of the
pact, even if they remained within the technical limits
of the agreement.

And yet, any treaty that two or more

parties negotiate should be written in such a way that
neither side gains an undue advantage through it, or is
left with so much maneuvering room that they can violate
either the letter or the spirit of the accord.
II such a treaty?

Was SALT

In this writer's opinion, no.

The

intentions of the successive American negotiators were
66
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g ood, but the final result of their work was badly
flawed.
On three major points the specific terms of the
treaty can be called into account.
of heavy ICBMs.

The first is the area

Allowing the Soviet Union to deploy 308

SS-18s, with a combined megatonnage greater than that of
our ICBM and SLBM forces combined, and prohibiting a
similar weapons system to the United States is ludicrous,
and worse, potentially destabilizing.

Giving up equal

rights to such a powerful weapon makes their future
reduction and elimination far more difficult, if not
improbable.

The method of dealing with the Backfire

bomber is the second area of concern where the treaty
runs into difficulty.

The weight of the evidence is that

this modern bomber has an intercontinental range, and yet
the SALT II treaty ex empts these planes from any
realistic restraints.
Finally, the handling of verification is extremely
questionable as well.

SALT II forbids the deliberate

interference with national technical means of verifi
cation, yet permits the encryption of missile test data,
a substantial interference with American verification
efforts.

Thus the treaty not only codified a unilateral

Soviet right to heavy ICBMs and legitimized the Backfire
bomber as being free from limitations, but it also
legitimized Soviet efforts to interfere with United
States verification efforts.
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In brief, eleven years of negotiation produced three
major arms control agreements of questionable worth, the
last of which was so flawed as to prove unacceptable "as
wa" to the U.S. Senate.

This same eleven year period

a l s o saw a buildup of Soviet strategic forces that
continued unabated, while the United States lagged far
behind in its own buildup ( see Appendix C).

Indeed,

d u r i n g t h e l a t t e r p a rt of the 1970s the Carter
a dministration engaged in a w h olesale gutting of
modernization programs in the United States strategic
arsenal while vigorously pursing completion of the SALT
II accord.

To answer the question posed at the beginning

of this paper, was SALT II a "good deal" for the United
States?

No.

The treaty as submitted contained too many

loopholes to adequately serve the national security needs
of the United States at that time.
Beyond SALT II
In the aftermath of the failure of the SALT II
treat y ,

Carter tried to revive the concept of arms

control.

But the mood of the public, as well as the mood

of the Senate, w a s against him.

The presidential

election of 1980 brought Ronald Reagan into, the White
House.

Reagan, a conservative Republican, was publicly

skeptical a b out the value of arms control, and had
opposed the ratification of SALT II.

Claiming that the
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Uni ted S tates was falling behind the Soviet Union
militarily, he embarked on a military buildup that saw
the Defense Department's budget nearly double in four
years.
Abroad, the Soviet Union went through three leaders
•
i n rapid succession --Brezhnev, Yuri A ndropov, and
Konstantin Chernenko--before the Communist Party selected
the comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev as the
country's new leader.

.

. . Arms
The arms talks--renamed START, for Strategic

Reduction Talks--continued to pursue a two-track policy
of negotiating on both strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons.

For a while, it appeared as if the talks would

flounder on the issue of Euromissiles.

These were medium

..

range missiles that the United States sought to deploy in
Western Europe to counter a perceived Soviet buildup of
similar weapons in Eastern Europe and the Western part of
the Soviet Union.

Negotiations eventually resumed,

however, and while talks on strategic weapons failed to
produce an agreement, discussions on the Intermediate
Range Forces, or INF, ultimately proved to be successful.
After a number of false starts and two brief summit
meetings between the two leaders, Reagan and Gorbachev
met in Washington D.C. in December of 1987 to sign the
INF accord.

This treaty mandated the destruction of all
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medium and intermediate range nuclear missiles in the
arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
The irony in this landmark agreement is that it was
singed by Ronald Reagan, the man who had been one of the
leading critics of the arms control process throughout
the 1970s.

It might be argued that the SALT process and

SALT II helped prepare the way for the INF accord.

If

this is true, then SALT--and SALT II--did serve a useful
purp o s e.

Whil e it s ti l l would n o t justify t h e

ratification of SALT II, it does partially serve to
redeem that flawed treaty.

Appendix A
Selected Articles - SALT II
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SELECTED ARTICLES - SALT II
ARTICLE II:

For the purpose of this treaty:
1.

Intercontinental ballistic missile .launchers are
land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of
a range in excess of the shortest distance between the
northeastern border of the continental part of the
United States of America and the northwestern border
of the continental part of the territory of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in
excess of 5500 kilometers.

2.

Submarine launched ballistic missile launchers are
launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any
nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern
ballistic missiles installed on any submarine,
regardless of its type.

3.

Heavy bombers: are considered to be:
a. currently for the United States of America, bombers
of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of
Soviet Socialists Republics, bombers of the Tupolev
95 and Myasischev types.
b.

in the future, types of bombers which can carry out
the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar
or superior to that of bombers listed in
subparagraph (a) above;

c.

types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and

d.

types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.

4.

Air to Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) are any such
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers
and installed in an aircraft or on its external
mountings.

5.

Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are
launchers of the type developed and tested for
launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.
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6.

ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which
have been flight tested with Mirvs.

7.

Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch weight
greater or a throw weight greater than that of the
heaviest, in terms of either launch weight or throw
weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by
either Party as of the date of signature of this
treaty.

8.

cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guide�,
weapon delivery vehicles which sustain flight through
the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight
path and which are flight tested from or deployed on
aircraft, that is air launched cruise missiles, or such
vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in
subparagraph l(b) of Article IX.

1.

ARTICLE III
,;
Upon entry into
force of this treaty, each Party
undertakes to'' limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,

heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to
exceed 2400.

2.

Each Party undertakes to limit from January 1, 1981,
strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of
this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2250,
and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of
that date would be in excess of that aggregate number.

3.

Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph
1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions
of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine
the composition of these aggregates.

4.

For each bomqer of a type equipped for ASBMs, the
aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this Article shall include the maximum number of such
missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped
for one operation mission.

5.

A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself
be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

6.

Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms
required to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1
and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided
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for in Article XI.
ARTICLE IV:

1.

Each Party undertakes not to start construction of
additional fixed ICBM launchers.

2.

Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM
launchers.

3.

Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light
ICBMs or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to
1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed
after that time.

4.

Each Party undertakes in the process of modernizing
and replacing ICBM silo launchers not to increase the
original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by
more than thifty-two percent. Within this limit, each
Party has the right to determine whether such an
increase will be made through an increase in the
original diam�ter
or in the original depth of an ICBM
'
silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

5.

Each Party undertakes:
a. not to supply. ICBM launcher deployment areas with
intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of
a number consistent with normal deployment,
maintenance, ·training, and replacement
requirements.
b.

not to provide storage facilities for or to store
ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements
at launch sites of ICBM launchers.

c.

not to develop, test, or deploy systems for the
rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

6.

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party
undertakes not to have under construction at any time
strategic off�nsive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of
Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a
normal construction schedule.

7.

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy
ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw
weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of
either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of
the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party at the date of
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signature of this Treaty.
8.

Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based
launchers of pallistic missiles which are not ICBMs
into launchers for launchers for launching ICBMs, and
not to test them for this purpose.

9.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new
types of ICBMs, that is, types of IGBMs not flight
tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may
flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.

10.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy
ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with
a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum
number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of
that type has been flight-tested as of that date.

11.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy
ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to
paragraph 9 �f this Article with a number of reentry
vehicles gre�ter than the maximum number of reentry
vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is ten.

12.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy
SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than
the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an
SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May
1, 1979, that is, 14.

13.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy
ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than
the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an
ICBM of either Party has been flight tested as of May
1, 1979, that is, 10.

14.

Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on
heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of
a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such
cruise missiies which exceeds the product of 28 and
the number of such heavy bombers.
ARTICLE V:

1.

Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph
1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs
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equipped with MIRV, and heavy bombers equipped with
cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers to! an aggregate number not to exceed 1320.
2.

Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph
1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit
launchers of ,ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs and
ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1200.

3.

Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph
2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit
launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate
number not to exceed 820.

4.

For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped
with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in
paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the
maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type
is equipped for one operational mission.

5.

Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs
1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the
provisions of this Treaty, each party has the right
to determine the compositions of these aggregates.
ARTICLE VI

1.

2.

The limitations in this Treaty shall apply to those
arms which are:
a. Operational
b.

In the final stages of development

c.

In reserve, in storage, or mothballed.

d.

Undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or
conversion.

Those arms in the final stages of construction are:
a. SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea
trials. '·
b.

c.

ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped with such
missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant,
or other facility where its final assembly or
conversion for the purpose of equipping it with
such missiles has been performed.
other strategic offensive arms which are finally
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assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility
after th.,:ey have been brought out of the shop,
plant, 6� other facility where their final
assemble! has been performed.
3.

ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the
limitation provided for in Article v, which undergo
conversion into launchers of a type subject to that
limitation, shall become subject to the limitation as
follows:
a. Fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion
reaches the stage which first definitely indicates
that are being converted.
b.

SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine
first goes to sea after that conversion has been
performed.

4.

ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a
bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not
subject to thb limitation provided for in Article V
into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are
subject to th°at limitation when the bomber is brought
out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such
conversion has been performed.

5.

A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become
subject to that limitation when it is brought out of
the shop, plant, or other facility where it has. been
converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for
cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600
kilometers. A bomber of a type not subject to the
limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article
III shall become subject to that limitation and to the
limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V
when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other
facility where is has been converted into a bomber of
a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range
in excess of too kilometers.

·.

6.

7.

The arms subject to the limitations provided for in
this Treaty shall continue to be subject to those
limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed or
otherwise cease to be subject to these limitation under
procedures to be agreed upon.

In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the
Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative
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Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions
of the Article.
ARTICLE IX:

1.

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:
a.

Ballistic missiles of a range in excess of 600
kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles
other than submarines, or launchers of such
vehicles.

b.

Fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for
emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or
on the beds of internal waters or inland waters, or
in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such
missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean
floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters
and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

c.

2.

, placing into Earth orbit nuclear
Systems for
weapons or any other kind of weapon of mass
destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;

d.

Mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

e.

SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater, or a
throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in
terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight,
respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either
party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

f.

ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater, or a
throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in
terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight,
respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either
party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

Each Party un�ertakes not to flight-test from an
aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple
independently targetable warheads and not to deploy
such missiles on aircraft.
ARTICLE XV:

1.

For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall
use national technical means of verification at its
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recognized principles of international law.
2.

Each Party utj.1dertakes not to interfere with the
national technical means of verification of the other
Party operatibg in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
Article.

3.

Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification ·by national
technical means of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes
in current construction, assembly, conversion, or
overhaul practices.
SELECTED ARTICLES - SALT II PROTOCOL:
ARTICLE I:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers
or to flight test ICBMs from such launchers.
ARTICLE II:

1.

Each Party untlertakes not to deploy cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea
based launchers or land-based launchers.

2.

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers
which are equipped with multiple independently
targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or land
based launchers.

3.

For the purpose of this protocol, cruise missiles are
unmanned, self-propelled, guided weapon-delivery
vehicles which sustain flight through the use of
aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and
which are flight tested from or deployed on sea-bed or
land-based launchers, that is, launched cruise missiles
and ground launched cruise missiles, respectively.
ARTICLE III:

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.
ARTICLE IV:

This protocol shall be considered an integral part of the
Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry
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into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through
December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement
on further limiti�g strategic offensive arms.

Appendix B
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1.

ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile - any missile capable of
destroying an enemy missile in flight, before the
latter reaches its target.

2.

ALCM:

3.

BACKFIRE: American code name for a.Soviet bomber that
first appeared in 1974.
Debate exists over whether
it should be counted as a strategic delivery vehicle
or not.

4.

BALLISTIC MISSILE: Any missile propelled by a rocket.
The rocket's thrust determines the missiles course and
point of impact.
It cannot change course in mid
flight.

5.

CRUISE MISSILE: A missile
at subsonic speed within
guided to its target, has
launched from the ground,

6.

FIRST STRIKE� · A first offensive move in a nuclear war,
designed to knock out the enemy's ability to retaliate
effectively 1n kind.

7.

ICBM:
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
A land
based, rocket-propelled missile capable of carrying
one or more warheads over a distance of 3000 miles or
more.

8.

LAUNCHER:
In SALT, a device such as a silo, a
submarine tube, or a strategic bomber, from which a
strategic weapon is launched.

9.

MIRV:
Multiple Independently
Vehicle. One of several warheads
missile, which can be separated
warheads and directed at separate

10.

MOBILE BASINq MODE: A system for making ICBMs mobile,
thus harder to locate and less vulnerable to attack.

11.

SECOND STRIKE:
A nuclear attack in response to an
enemy's FIRST STRIKE.

12.

SILO: An underground launcher for· an ICBM, hardened
with reinforced concrete to reduce its vulnerability.

Air-Launched Cruise Missile.

that flies like an airplane
It can be
the atmosphere.
a varying range, and can be
sea, or air.

Targetable Reentry
mounted on a single
from its companion
targets.
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13.

SLBM:
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile.
Ballistic Missile launched from a submarine.

A

14. STRATEGIC BOMBER: A bomber of intercontinental range,
capable of serving as a STRATEGIC WEAPON.
15.

STRATEGIC WEAPON:

Any long-range weapon - an ICBM, a
SLBM, or a STRATEGIC BOMBER - designed to hit targets
in the enemy's homeland.

16.

SUBLIMIT: One part or portion of an overall limit on
something.

17.

TACTICAL WEAPON:
A weapon intended for battlefield
use in a local or regional theater of operations.
Also called a "theater weapon."
Contrast with
STRATEGIC WEAPON.

18.

THROW-WEIGHT:
The combined weight of all warheads,
guidance systems, and decoys carried by a single
missile; the useful payload of a missile.

19.

TRIAD:
The threefold structure of U.S. and Soviet
strategic forces, consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs, and
STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

20.

WARHEAD:
The part of a missile's payload that
explodes upon reaching its target.
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STRATEGIC WEAPONS INTRODUCTION
1972 TO 1982
UNITED STATES:
1. Trident I SLBM - 1979
f
2. Tri�ent
Submarine - 1981
SOVIET UNION:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

SS-i8 ICBM - 1974
SS-17 ICBM - 1975
SS-19 ICBM - 1975
SSN-8 SLBM - 1973
SSN-18 SLBM - 1978
SSN-17 SLBM - 1978
Delta I Submarine - 1972
Delta II Submarine - 1974
Delta III Submarine - 1978
Backfire Bomber - 1974
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LIST OF KEY ACTORS
1. Leonid Brezhnev: General Secretary, Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. Signed SALT I and II treaties,
as well as the Vladivostok Accord.
2.

Jimmy Carter:., American President. Concluded SALT II
negotiations with the SALT II treaty of 1979, but
was unable to secure its ratification.

3.

Gerald Ford: American President. Continued the SALT
II negotiations begun by his predecessor,
President Nixon. Signed the Vladivostok Accord in
1974.

4.

Mikhail Gorbachev: General Secretary, Communist Party
of the Soviet Union.
Signed the INF treaty in
1987.

5.

Henry Jackson: Democratic Senator. National security
expert, authored the Jackson amendment to SALT I,
that established the doctrine of essential
equivalence.

6.

Lvndon Johnson: American President. Laid the
groundw9rk for the SALT negotiations,
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

7.

Robert McNamara:
Secretary of Defense during the
Johnson·years.
Supported Johnson's efforts to
start the SALT talks.

8.

Richard Nixon: American President. SALT negotiations
began during his first term. Signed the SALT I
treaty, began the SALT II talks.

9.

Ronald Reagan: American President.
treaty in 1987.

Signed the INF

10.

Secretary of State during the first
Cvrus Vance:
three years of the Carter administration.. SALT
II advocate.

11.

Paul Warnke: Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency r�uring the early Carter years.
SALT II
advocat�.
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